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Abstract 
	
In	A	Serious	Proposal	to	the	Ladies	parts	I	and	II,	Mary	Astell	argues	that	social	conditioning	
impacts	women’s	self-image	in	such	a	way	as	to	prevent	them	from	striving	for	scholarly	
achievement.	Astell’s	solution	is	to	allow	women	to	withdraw	from	society	into	dedicated	
schools	for	women	and	by	women,	as	an	alternative	to	marriage	and	family	life.	In	this	paper,	I	
will	explore	some	of	the	implications	of	that	argument,	how	it	might	be	expanded	to	other	
marginalized	populations,	and	argue	that	despite	Astell’s	proposed	solution	being	proven	to	
create	at	least	as	many	problems	as	it	solves,	the	groundwork	laid	in	her	arguments	can	form	a	
basis	for	a	functional	model	of	educational	justice	today.	We	have	learned	that	“separate,	but	
equal”	education	is	not	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	“achievement	gaps”	between	privileged	
and	marginalized	populations.	If	social	conditioning	impacts	educational	drive	and	achievement	
for	women,	then	it	also	impacts	other	oppressed	populations.	I	maintain	that	subverting	this	
structural	oppression	is	a	key	to	dismantling	it	and	achieving	educational	justice.	The	typical	
foundations	for	educational	justice	come	from	the	imperative	that	education	makes	better	
citizens	or	that	education	allows	further	education	on	a	topic.	I	maintain	that	if	the	goal	is	
educational	justice,	it	is	necessary	to	overcome	the	determinants	of	social	conditioning. 
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Introduction	
René	Descartes	is	frequently	cited	as	the	“father	of	modern	philosophy”.	His	impact	
upon	the	field	is	challenging	to	overstate	as	there	are	still	philosophers	wrestling	with	the	
questions	he	raised	some	four	centuries	ago.	Much	less	well	known	is	Mary	Astell,	said	to	be	
the	“first	English	feminist”	(Batchelor,	2002).	Though	she	was	not	progressive	by	today’s	
standards,	being	a	royalist	and	both	politically	and	religiously	conservative,	still	she	wrote	and	
published	in	the	late	seventeenth	and	early	eighteenth	centuries	on	the	topic	of	women’s	
intellectual	advancement	and	equality	of	reason.	While	Descartes	himself	expressed	a	belief	in	
equality	between	the	sexes,	his	concept	of	mind/body	dualism	has	often	been	cited	by	scholars	
as	contributory	to	the	systemic,	institutional	oppression	of	women,	on	the	basis	of	their	being	
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deemed	less	rational,	and	more	closely	affiliated	with	the	body	and	its	sensual	nature	than	
men.	Much	scholarship	has	been	done	on	this	topic,	and	a	full	exploration	of	that	connection	is	
outside	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	a	brief	survey	will	be	included	for	context.	The	reader	is	
encouraged	to	examine	more	closely	the	works	referenced	for	a	detailed	treatment	of	that	
topic.	Astell	presented	a	philosophical	account	of	minds	and	bodies	that	differed	significantly	
from	that	offered	by	Descartes,	holding	that	humans	are	a	union	of	mind	and	body,	and	that	
one	can	act	upon	the	other.	She	posits	a	metaphysics	of	differentiated	individuals,	each	with	
unique	abilities,	wherein	experience	directly	impacts	an	individual’s	ability	to	reason.	It	is	upon	
this	ground	that	she	builds	the	argument	that	women	are	no	less	capable	of	reason	than	men,	
but	that	social	conditioning	leads	them	to	believe	–	and	thus	act	as	if	–	they	are.	In	this	paper,	I	
will	explore	Astell’s	arguments	in	contrast	with	those	of	Descartes	to	explicate	this	early	
modern	example	of	a	social	justice	orientated	epistemology	and	some	of	its	implications,	as	
well	as	to	explore	the	applicability	of	her	concepts	today.	
	
Mind	Body	Dualism	
	 	 In	his	Discourse	on	the	Method,	René	Descartes	clearly	and	definitively	established	
mind/body	dualism:	“this	me	—	this	soul	that	makes	me	what	I	am	—	is	entirely	distinct	from	
the	body,	is	easier	to	know	than	the	body,	and	would	still	be	just	what	it	is	even	if	the	body	
didn’t	exist”	(Descartes,	p.	15).	In	the	culmination	of	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy,	he	
revisited	this,	writing:	
My	essence	consists	entirely	in	my	being	a	thinking	thing.	[…]	because	on	the	one	
hand	I	have	a	clear	and	distinct	idea	of	myself,	insofar	as	I	am	merely	a	thinking	
thing	and	not	an	extended	thing,	and	because	on	the	other	hand	I	have	a	distinct	
idea	of	a	body,	insofar	as	it	is	merely	an	extended	thing	and	not	a	thinking	thing,	
it	is	certain	that	I	am	really	distinct	from	my	body,	and	can	exist	without	it.	(p.	
51)	
Though	mind/body	dualism	was	hardly	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	being,	Descartes’	
formulation	of	the	idea	came	to	be	broadly	embraced.	A	positive	result	of	this	was	the	
furtherance	of	medicine.	A	doctrine	of	the	Catholic	Church	called	“the	resurrection	of	the	body”	
maintains	that	for	a	person	to	go	to	Heaven	at	the	Resurrection,	the	body	needs	to	be	intact.	As	
a	result	of	this	doctrine,	many	countries	prohibited	or	severely	limited	the	study	of	anatomy	
through	dissection.	Dr.	Neeta	Mehta,	in	her	article,	“Mind-body	Dualism:	A	Critique	from	a	
Health	Perspective”,	writes:	“[T]here	was	a	religious	prohibition	on	the	study	of	human	
anatomy	through	dissection.	Descartes,	through	mind-body	dualism,	demythologized	body	and	
handed	over	its	study	to	medicine”	(Mehta,	2011).		While	this	is	certainly	a	positive	outcome,	
not	every	use	of	Descartes’	work	was	so	benign.	As	Elizabeth	V.	Spelman	writes:		
[W]hen	one	recalls	that	the	Western	philosophical	tradition	has	not	been	noted	
for	its	celebration	of	the	body,	and	that	women's	nature	and	women's	lives	have	
long	been	associated	with	the	body	and	bodily	functions,	then	a	question	is	
suggested.	What	connection	might	there	be	between	attitudes	toward	the	body	
and	attitudes	toward	women?	(1982,	p.	110)			
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	 	 Dr.	Sarah	E.	Johnson	has	an	answer	to	Spelman’s	question:	“As	allegedly	more	subject	to	
the	body	than	men	were,	women	possessed	less	reason	and	lacked	control	over	their	passions,	
determined	in	large	part,	of	course,	by	the	body’s	humoural	balance”	(p.	12).	Johnson	goes	on	
to	explain	that	“[n]ot	only	were	women	more	bodily	than	men,	but	their	bodies	were	also	
physiologically	inferior	[…]	matching	their	easily	swayed	mental	constitutions”	(2014,	p.	12).	
Whilst	this	misogyny	did	not	originate	with	Descartes,	his	formulation	of	mind/body	dualism	at	
the	very	least	contributed	to	the	justifications	for	the	attitude	toward	women,	and	thus	to	the	
oppression	engaged	in	under	such	justification.	Genevieve	Lloyd	provides	a	stark	example,	
quoting	Hegel:	
Women	are	educated	–	who	knows	how?	–	as	it	were	by	breathing	in	
ideas,	by	living	rather	than	by	acquiring	knowledge.	The	status	of	
manhood,	on	the	other	hand,	is	attained	only	by	the	stress	of	thought	
and	much	technical	exertion.		(qtd.	in	Lloyd,	38)			
Lloyd	adds,	“In	western	thought,	maleness	has	been	seen	as	itself	an	achievement,	attained	by	
breaking	away	from	the	more	‘natural’	condition	of	women”	(1984,	p.	38).	This	is	not	to	say	
that	these	justifications	have	ever	been	required	in	human	history	to	fuel	prejudice	against	any	
marginalized	group	–	in	fact,	it	is	often	that	these	arguments	are	posed	as	a	means	of	
legitimizing	already	extant	prejudices.	Just	as	with	the	prejudice	against	Black	people	in	the	
writings	of	the	early	modern	period	of	philosophy	–	as	explored	by	many	critical	race	theorists,	
including	Emmanuel	Eze,	Barbara	Hall,	and	Debra	Nails,	just	to	name	a	few	–	misogyny	has	a	
long	history	of	pseudo-scientific	and	ostensibly	“rational”	arguments	made	by	predominantly	
white	men	to	attach	a	veneer	of	reason	to	a	markedly	unenlightened	emotional	reaction	to	
perceived	threats	to	their	hegemony.	The	very	concept	of	“reason”	carries	a	bias	toward	white,	
European	masculinity.	
	
Equality	and	Gendering	of	Reason	
We	can	look	back	as	far	as	Pythagoras	and	see	“female”	equated	with	“bad”,	and	“male”	with	
“good”	in	his	famous	table	of	opposites.		Phyllis	Rooney,	in	“Gendered	Reason:	Sex	Metaphor	
and	Conceptions	of	Reason,”	writes	that,	with	the	rise	of	Enlightenment	ideals,	many	of	the	
images	of	male	as	dominant,	causal,	and	active	and	female	as	incomplete,	in	subjugation,	and	
passive	may	appear	to	be	left	behind,	“but	we	get	what	is	at	best	a	shift	in	the	articulated,	
explicit	claims	about	reason	and	mind”	(p.	82).	She	goes	on	to	note	that	Descartes	“allowed	
that	‘even	women’	could	develop	his	rational	method.”	In	spite	of	Descartes’	generosity	toward	
women,	Susan	Bordo	finds	in	Descartes	a	culmination	of	a	“rebirthing	of	nature	(as	machine)	
and	knowledge	(as	objectivity)”,	resulting	in	a	“supermasculinized	model	of	knowledge	in	which	
detachment,	clarity,	and	transcendence	of	the	body	are	all	key	requirements”	(p.	50).	
Genevieve	Lloyd	delves	into	this	concept	in	her	book,	Man	of	Reason:	“Male”	and	“Female”	in	
Western	Philosophy.	She	writes,	“through	[Descartes’]	philosophy,	Reason	took	on	special	
associations	with	the	realm	of	pure	thought,	which	provides	the	foundations	of	science,	and	
with	the	deductive	ratiocination	which	was	of	the	essence	of	his	method”	(p.	49).	She	
continues:		
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We	owe	to	Descartes	an	influential	and	pervasive	theory	of	mind,	which	
provides	support	for	a	powerful	version	of	the	sexual	division	of	mental	
labour.	Women	have	been	assigned	responsibility	for	that	realm	of	the	
sensuous	which	the	Cartesian	Man	of	Reason	must	transcend,	if	he	is	to	
have	true	knowledge	of	things.	(1984,	p.	50)	
This	“Cartesian	Man	of	Reason”	is	one	who	has	sufficient	free	time	to	spend	long	periods	in	
meditation,	who	holds	fast	to	reason	(the	realm	of	the	mind),	as	opposed	to	non-reason	(the	
realm	of	the	body),	he	not	only	judges,	but	specifically	judges	well,	and,	as	Descartes	
enumerates	in	his	Discourse	on	Method,	he	is	capable	of	“telling	the	true	from	the	false”;	he	is	
able	to	learn	anything	just	as	well	as	anyone	else	if	they	simply	take	their	thoughts	along	the	
appropriate	path	(p.	1).	Though	Descartes	held	that	“even	women”	could	develop	his	rational	
method,	common	sentiment	of	the	day	held	that	women	“are	naturally	incapable	of	acting	
prudently”	and	“necessarily	determined	to	folly”	(Astell,	2014).	Here	is	enshrined	the	binary	
between	mind	and	body,	and	thus,	between	men	and	women.	
	
Mind/Body	Unions	
In	contrast	to	Descartes’	dualism,	Mary	Astell	asserts	that	people	are	unions	of	minds	
and	bodies.	In	A	Serious	Proposal	to	the	Ladies,	she	writes:	“We	know	and	feel	the	Union	
between	our	Soul	and	Body,	but	who	amongst	us	sees	so	clearly,	as	to	find	out	with	Certitude	
and	Exactness,	the	secret	ties	which	unite	two	such	different	Substances,	or	how	they	are	able	
to	act	upon	each	other”	(Astell,	1994,	1994,	p.	101)?	
If	all	people	are	unions	of	both	mind	and	body,	then	the	marginalization	of	women	on	
the	basis	of	their	‘natural	condition’	is	revealed	as	problematic.	Rather	than	being	creatures	of	
‘pure	reason’,	men	are	just	as	‘bodily’	as	women,	just	as	susceptible	to	passions,	tempers,	and	
the	other	aspects	of	their	physicality	as	impedances	to	their	reason.	It	is	upon	this	ground	that	
Astell	builds	her	argument	that	women	are	no	less	capable	of	reason	than	men.	But	if	this	is	so,	
how	do	we	explain	the	gross	disproportionality	of	educational	achievement	between	men	and	
women	during	the	early	modern	period?	According	to	Astell,	it	is	nothing	more	than	the	natural	
result	of	the	oppression	resulting	from	the	belief	in	mind/body	dualism,	and	the	nature	of	
women	as	“more	bodily	than	men.”	
	
Social	Conditioning	and	its	Effects	upon	Reason	
Astell	argues	that	social	conditioning	is	the	cause	of	an	achievement	gap	between	
women	and	men,	educationally.		In	responding	to	the	accusation	that	“women	are	naturally	
incapable	of	acting	prudently	or	that	they	are	necessarily	determined	to	folly”	she	writes:		
	
The	incapacity,	if	there	be	any,	is	acquired,	not	natural	.	.	.	The	cause	therefore	of	
the	defects	we	labor	under	is,	if	not	wholly,	yet	at	least	in	the	first	place,	to	be	
ascribed	to	the	mistakes	of	our	education	which	.	.	.	spreads	its	ill	influence	
through	all	our	lives.	(Astell,	2014,	pp.	55-56)	
	
She	goes	on	to	more	clearly,	and	rather	acerbically,	cast	the	blame	at	the	feet	of	patriarchal	
society:		
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Women	are	from	their	very	infancy	debarred	those	advantages	with	the	want	of	
which	they	are	afterwards	reproached	and	nursed	up	in	those	vices	which	will	
hereafter	be	upbraided	to	them,	so	partial	are	men	as	to	expect	brick	where	they	
afford	no	straw	and	so	abundantly	civil	as	to	take	care	we	should	make	good	that	
obliging	epithet	of	ignorant	which	out	of	an	excess	of	good	manners	they	are	
pleased	to	bestow	on	us!	(2014,	p.	56)	
Her	argument	is	that	experiences,	particularly	experiences	of	oppression	and	degradation,	train	
a	person	to	believe	that	all	they	are	capable	of	is	that	to	which	they	are	constantly	being	told	
they	are	limited.	It	is	popular,	particularly	in	educational	circles,	to	sum	this	up	as	“students	rise	
(or	fall)	to	the	level	of	expectations.”	The	majority	of	women	in	her	day	were	uneducated	and	
did	not	actively	seek	out	education,	not	because	they	were	incapable	of	being	educated,	but	
because	society	had	conditioned	them	to	believe	that	God	created	them	as	“lesser”	and	
incapable.	In	such	a	circumstance,	Astell	asserts	that	women	adopt	the	notion	that	they	are	
constantly	being	told,	that	they	are	“naturally	proud	and	vain,”	and	do	not	strive	beyond	that.	
This	leads	into	a	feedback	loop,	wherein	women	do	not	strive,	thus	they	do	not	achieve,	
confirming	the	perception	that	they	are	incapable	of	achievement,	and	therefore,	opportunities	
for	self-improvement	are	“wasted”	on	them.	This	scenario	can	easily	be	seen	in	many	times	and	
places	over	human	history,	continuing	to	the	present	day,	and	women	are	by	no	means	the	only	
victims	of	such	oppression.	
	
Social	Justice	Implications	of	the	Effects	of	Social	Conditioning	
This	feedback	loop	happens	to	people	occupying	many	other	axes	of	oppression.	We	
speak	today	of	achievement	gaps	in	inner	city	schools.	We	segregate	differently	abled	students	
into	“special	education”	classes,	regardless	of	the	nature	or	severity	of	their	differentiation	of	
ability.	We	had	a	Supreme	Court	Justice	commenting	about	those	who	believe	that	“it	does	not	
benefit	African-Americans	to	get	them	into	[elite	universities]	where	they	do	not	do	well,	as	
opposed	to	having	them	go	to	a	less-advanced	school,	[…]	where	they	do	well”	(Fisher	v.	UT	
Austin,	2015).	Astell’s	solution	was	to	establish	separate	schools	for	women,	but	United	States	
history	has	clearly	demonstrated	the	results	of	a	“separate	but	equal”	educational	system.	
How,	then,	can	this	situation	–	which	is	obviously	still	a	problem	today	–	be	resolved?	
	
Socially	Conscious	Education	
Any	attempt	to	rectify	the	structural	injustice	built	into	educational	models	needs	to	
address	both	sides	of	this	issue.	José	Medina,	in	his	book,	The	Epistemology	of	Resistance:	
Gender	and	Racial	Oppression,	Epistemic	Injustice,	and	Resistant	Imaginations,	asserts	that	the	
experience	of	being	oppressed	can,	in	some	ways,	present	an	epistemic	advantage,	in	that	
oppression	provokes	the	formation	of	learning	processes	that	the	privileged	have	less	
opportunity	to	develop.	The	oppressed,	he	writes,	“tend	to	be	better	listeners,	having	a	more	
acute	attentiveness	to	hermeneutical	gaps”	(Medina,	2012).	Oppressed	agents	see	more	of	the	
oppressive	structures	than	privileged	agents,	as	they	are	the	ones	who	keenly	feel	the	effects	of	
those	structures.	Privileged	agents	often	struggle	to	see	institutional	oppression	in	the	
structures	of	society,	much	less	the	ways	in	which	they	are	participatory.	This	is	why,	if	we	wish	
to	dismantle	structural	oppression	and	create	a	just	educational	system,	education	must	
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actively	affirm	the	lucidity	and	capabilities	of	vulnerable	agents	and	work	to	counter	the	social	
conditioning	these	agents	often	have	to	overcome.	Further,	such	a	system	must	also	actively	
engage	in	educating	the	ignorance	of	privileged	agents	on	the	topic	of	systemic	oppression.	
Educational	programs	must,	at	all	levels,	both	reflect	and	teach	diversity.	The	study	of	cultures	
and	people	occupying	axes	of	oppression	must	cease	to	be	segregated	into	various	tracks	of	
cultural	studies,	and,	instead,	be	included	as	part	of	core	curricula	at	all	levels.	If	we	would	live	
up	to	Descartes’	belief	in	the	equality	of	ability,	we	must	follow	in	the	steps	of	Mary	Astell,	and	
accept	that	the	differences	between	us	are	just	that:	differences,	not	limitations.	Different	
bodies	are	not	lesser	bodies,	and	neither	are	the	minds	or	capacities	to	achieve	associated	
therewith.			
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